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Abstract:  Collaboration with native auxiliaries in wars in the peripheries of 
the international system is an age-old practice, the relevance of which is likely 
to increase in the twenty-first century. Yet, the parameters of such 
collaboration are understudied. This article aims to contribute to the nascent 
yet fragmentary scholarship on the use of native auxiliaries. It identifies three 
intellectual templates of the collaboration between western regular forces and 
native auxiliaries: the eighteenth century model of auxiliary ‘partisans’ as 
tactical complements to regular armed forces; the nineteenth century 
transformation of the ‘partisan’ into the irregular guerrilla fighter and the 
concomitant rise of the ‘martial races’ discourse; and, finally, the post-1945 
model of the loyalist auxiliary as a symbol of the political legitimacy of the 
counter-insurgent side in wars of decolonization and post-colonial 
insurgencies. The article focuses on the rise of loyalism after 1945 in 
particular, a phenomenon that it seeks to understand within the broader 
context of irregular warfare and the moral reappraisal of irregular fighters after 
the Second World War. 
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Native auxiliaries in counter-insurgency campaigns and colonial warfare are 
an understudied topic, in spite of their central relevance to western warfare in the 
peripheries of the international system.1 There are only a handful of scholarly articles 
available on this topic, a number of which remain at the surface of the debate by 
focusing solely on the tactical and operational potentials and pitfalls of the use of 
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native auxiliaries.2 Few take into account the broader strategic, political, moral and 
legal implications of cooperating with such forces.3 
 
This lack of scholarship is both surprising and worrying when viewed against 
the background of recent and current military conflicts. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and 
again Iraq/Syria, but also Russia’s reliance on separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine, 
have demonstrated that the cooperation between western military forces and native 
auxiliaries is likely to play a dominant role, at least in the near future. Yet western 
strategic thinking on the ways in which native auxiliaries can be integrated into 
military operations, how they can be supported and trained if necessary, remains poor. 
There is little understanding of the different models and templates of the structure and 
organization of such collaboration, with the result that the way in which auxiliaries 
are employed has often unintended, if to some extent foreseeable, consequences.4 
 
This article aims to reinvigorate the nascent, yet still highly fragmentary 
debate on native auxiliaries by investigating the historical trajectory of the 
relationship between regular forces and local fighters. It outlines three intellectual 
templates of their collaboration, which roughly correspond to three different historical 
phases, though the boundaries between these phases are not clear-cut, and earlier 
templates often survived into, or were revived during, later phases. The first template 
is the eighteenth century model of the native auxiliary as an ethnic irregular fighter 
and tactical complement to regular armed forces. Historically, these fighters were 
called ‘partisans’. The second template covers the marginalization of ‘partisans’ as 
illegitimate combatants and their concomitant, yet paradoxical reinvention in the form 
of ‘martial races’. The latter formed the core of late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century colonial armies, which became increasingly regularized and integrated into 
the European military command structures. The third template consists of the rise of 
native loyalist auxiliaries after 1945. Loyalism in this context is not to be understood 
as a description of the ‘true’ motives of the auxiliaries in question. Rather, ‘loyalism’ 
functioned as a strategic and political narrative that constructed a specific relationship 
between sponsors and auxiliaries. This narrative could be manipulated by both sides 
to a certain extent – auxiliaries could pursue their own agendas under the guise of 
‘loyalism’, just as well as sponsors could promote or drop ‘loyalist’ auxiliaries for 
opportunistic motives. Nonetheless, the narrative of loyalism provided certain 
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constraints on legitimate behavior by both sides, as we shall see. For instance, if 
particular auxiliaries were evidently coerced into supporting their sponsors’ military 
efforts, sponsors usually refrained from trying to depict them as ‘loyalists’, since such 
an effort would have lacked credibility. 
 
The rise of loyalist auxiliaries represents a departure from the earlier trend 
towards the increasing regularization of colonial troops. They were deliberately set 
apart from regular armed forces and often stayed outside of the regular military 
command structures. Their military effectiveness was limited as a result of poor 
training and armament. In fact, the main motive for their recruitment was political 
rather than military, in that they were designed as symbol of legitimacy of western 
political power in the peripheries of the international system after 1945. 
 
These three intellectual templates help us understand and categorize patterns 
in which native auxiliaries were used in the past and today. While the transformation 
around 1800 from ‘partisans’ to ‘guerrilla fighters’ has received some attention over 
the past few years, much less has been written about the rise of loyalism after 1945.5  
This is the area that this article will focus on in particular. Its main argument is that 
the Second World War led to a moral reappraisal of the role of irregular fighters in 
that it epitomized the lesson that as resistance fighters against Nazi German and 
Imperial Japanese occupation, they could be morally vindicated. Indeed, in the 
context of colonial and post-colonial wars after 1945, to the extent that they could be 
harnessed to the political agendas of colonial powers or their successors as loyalist 
auxiliaries, they could become the foundation of claims to political legitimacy on the 
part of the imperial powers in these conflicts. 
 
The historical evolution of military auxiliaries makes it inherently difficult to 
define them. Nonetheless a definition is needed. For the purpose of this paper, 
military auxiliaries are defined as military forces that support the military efforts of 
regular armed forces of a state. They are hence distinct from regular armies. At the 
same time, they are distinct from proxies, which are defined as receiving merely 
indirect support from third parties with the aim of furthering the latter’s strategic 
interest.6 
 
 4 
The remainder of this article proceeds in four steps: the next section presents a 
brief outline of the history of the native auxiliary fighter from around 1750 to 1945, 
hence covering both the first and the second intellectual template mentioned above. 
The second part is devoted to the rise of loyalist auxiliaries in the wars of 
decolonization. The third section will evaluate the rise of loyalism in the context of 
the history of irregular warfare after 1945. The conclusion will summarize the 
argument and explore its relevance for the context of wars in the twenty-first century. 
 
 
The transformation of the partisan, 1750-1945 
The practice of relying on military auxiliaries is as old as warfare itself. 
However, it was only when European armed forces became increasingly ‘regularized’ 
that military auxiliaries were referred to as actors different from regular armed forces. 
By the eighteenth century monarchs in Europe had successfully increased their 
control over their armies. However, paradoxically it had become increasingly difficult 
for them to use those armies to wage war. The average size of European armies had 
more than doubled between the mid-seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries. 
Mobilizing for major war slowed down economic production and inevitably put a 
strain on state finances. Communication capabilities had not grown in equal measure 
as the size of armies, hence limiting the radius of their campaigns. Tactical limitations 
meant that battles were often costly, but rarely decisive. 7  In these circumstances 
reliance on small mobile units of light infantry and light cavalry provided European 
states with increased room for manoeuvre. These units could either serve alongside 
regular units and take on tasks that regular forces struggled with, such as 
reconnaissance, or they could operate independently.8 They were something akin to 
early modern Special Forces.9 The names of these units often reflected their ethnic 
origin: the Habsburg empire relied on ‘Pandours’ and ‘Croats’ who stemmed from the 
border region with the Ottoman empire, Russia used ‘Cossacks’ and Bavaria and 
Prussia ‘Hussars’. The overall notion for these light infantry and cavalry detachments 
was ‘parties’ in French or ‘Partheyen’ in German. Their members were called 
‘partisans’.10  
 
While these practices originated in Europe, they were soon applied in colonial 
warfare. During the French and Indian War (1754-63) both France and Britain 
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recruited Native American auxiliaries to support their own forces. This was, of 
course, a common practice in colonial warfare. However, in the French and Indian 
War contemporaries perceived native auxiliaries not only as a supplement to their 
own forces. Rather, they saw them as a decisive asset. British commander-in-chief 
Lord Loudoun remarked in 1756 that ‘Whoever is Superior in irregulars [Native 
American auxiliaries] has an infinite advantage over the other side; and must greatly 
weaken, if not totally destroy them before they can get to the Point where they can 
make their Push.’11 
 
The turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century was a ‘watershed’ moment 
for the European ‘partisan’ auxiliaries. The notion of the ‘partisan’ was subject to a 
fundamental transformation. 12  With the French Revolution and the concomitant 
nationalization of war in Europe, the term ‘partisan’ came to designate counter-
revolutionary rebels. The tactical meaning of la petite guerre gave way to the notion 
of people’s war or guerrilla warfare – two terms that were burdened with issues of 
political legitimacy. The denunciation of ‘partisans’ and guerrilla fighters was based 
on a complex interplay of perceptions that included claims that their way of fighting 
was abhorrent, that they were fighting for the wrong motives and that they had no 
right to take up arms. At first glance, this transformative process was paradoxical: 
after all, with the nationalization of war even regular warfare had to a certain extent 
evolved into ‘people’s war’. The rhetoric of the French Revolution depicted the Army 
of the French Revolution as the ‘nation in arms’ rushing to the defence of the 
fatherland. If the counter-revolutionary rebels in the Vendée and the guerrilla fighters 
in the Peninsular War, to name but two examples from the era of the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, were also claiming to fight on behalf of the 
‘people’ (if not necessarily the ‘nation’) it was difficult to see why they were less 
legitimate than the ‘nation in arms’. Yet, it was precisely this ambiguity with respect 
to the intellectual roots of both the nationalization of European armed forces and 
popular uprisings against the authority of the nation state (or the occupation forces of 
another state) that made the condemnation of rebels and guerrillas necessary.13 
 
The marginalization of irregular fighters and their denunciation as illegitimate 
combatants remained the defining theme of warfare in both Europe and North 
America throughout the nineteenth century. Although European powers had hoped 
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that the issue of people’s war had been an aberration to which the era of restoration 
after 1815 had put a definitive end, people’s war cropped up again in the German 
wars of unification in the second half of the nineteenth century, specifically in the 
French mobilization of so-called ‘francs-tireurs’ during the Franco-Prussian War 
(1870-71). On the other side of the Atlantic, too, the American Civil War (1861-65) 
highlighted the extent to which the question of who was a legitimate combatant was 
bound up with conflicts of political ideology that were at the heart of the causes for 
the war itself. The perception of deep divergences was at the core of nascent efforts to 
codify the law of armed conflict such as the Lieber Code and the 1874 Brussels 
project. Owing precisely to the deep rifts in contemporary views on lawful 
combatancy, it took about four more decades until these efforts came to fruition in the 
shape of the 1907 Hague convention on land warfare. The convention bears the mark 
of the interest of large land powers such as Imperial Germany and Russia in keeping 
the definition of lawful combatants as closely tied to the idea of a professional land 
army as possible. 
 
Developments in the colonies in the nineteenth century ran parallel to these 
debates in Europe and North America. Colonial powers had at all times relied on local 
auxiliaries recruited from within their colonial territories or from nearby localities. In 
the second half of the nineteenth century all colonial powers regularized their 
irregular colonial auxiliaries to a certain extent. France recruited tirailleurs, colonial 
light infantry troops that were deployed both in the colonies and in European theatres 
of war. Britain and Germany followed the French example by transforming their 
semi-private colonial auxiliaries such as the East India Company and the Wissmann-
Truppe into (semi-)regular colonial forces. Several factors played a role in that 
transformation. In the case of Britain, the 1857 mutiny of the Bengal Army drove 
home the message that the pragmatic and straightforward recruitment of local 
auxiliaries into colonial forces was fraught with difficulties. According to Gavin 
Rand, native auxiliaries were ‘at once the pre-eminent institution of the imperial state 
and its greatest threat’.14 The experience of the 1857 mutiny and the predicament of 
recruiting native auxiliaries that it highlighted prompted the evolution of the concept 
of ‘martial races’. The notion of ‘martial races’ was based on the idea that some social 
and ‘ethnic’ groups in India (and elsewhere) were biologically or culturally more 
disposed to make effective and loyal soldiers than others. In the colonial context, 
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therefore, the eighteenth century tradition of using military auxiliaries as tactical 
complements to regular forces was replaced with racial theories on the ‘correct’ way 
of recruiting colonial auxiliaries.15 
 
The rise of the ‘martial races’ discourse in the context of colonial warfare was 
to a certain extent the flipside of the marginalization of irregular fighters in Europe. 
Characteristically, European imperialists approached their colonial auxiliaries with in 
the framework of an ‘orientalist’ perspective. Non-European fighters were assigned 
both attributes of inferiority and superiority.16 They were seen as inferior, because 
they were regarded as ‘savage’, ‘uncivilized’ and potentially ‘undisciplined’. At the 
same time, their negative attributes were perceived as an advantage: ‘uncivilized’ 
behaviour could translate into increased martial spirits and fighting prowess, 
‘childish’ traits of character could translate into overwhelming loyalty to their 
commanding officers and steadfastness under fire. At the same time, the ‘martial 
races’ discourse displayed some similarities with its eighteenth century predecessors: 
after all, eighteenth century light infantry and cavalry units had traditionally been 
recruited from among ethnic groups on the borders of Europe.17 However, the ‘cult of 
the regular’ and the marginalization of the irregular was an intellectual template that 
exerted its influence beyond the boundaries of Europe. The drive towards creating 
regular colonial armies could be observed among all imperial powers at the end of the 
nineteenth century. 
 
A further factor for the increasing regularization of colonial auxiliary troops 
came with the First World War and the realization of the manpower demands of 
industrialized mass warfare. France pioneered this development. While it had already 
deployed North African tirailleurs units in the Crimean War and in the Franco-
Prussian War, it was only during the last two-and-a-half years of the First World War 
that France massively relied on colonial troops from West Africa. In sum, it 
conscripted 140,000 West African troops into the French Army and deployed them on 
the western front. The French approach was inspired by a racial ideology that was 
similar to the British idea of ‘martial races’ in that it emphasized the characteristics of 
physical vigour, bravery and loyalty in colonial troops. At the same time, advocates of 
the mass recruitment of West African soldiers such as General Charles Mangin 
attributed traits to what he called ‘la force noire’ that seemed to make them 
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particularly suited to industrialized warfare in Europe: ‘the absence of nervousness 
and an incomparable power of shock. Their arrival on the battlefield would have a 
considerable moral effect on the adversary.’18 In other words – and this is another 
parallel to the eighteenth century theoretical origins of the use of auxiliaries – colonial 
troops were not merely supposed to augment European manpower. Rather, their 
advocates saw in them a possible solution to the tactical predicaments of the modern 
European battlefield.  
 
With increasing regularization, auxiliaries lost their irregular character and 
were transformed into members of the regular armed forces of their sponsor countries. 
However, this did not necessarily mean that their opponents treated them as they 
would have treated their metropolitan comrades, as widespread massacres committed 
on captured French colonial troops by Nazi German forces in 1940 illustrate.19 
 
 
Insurgencies after 1945: the rise of loyalist auxiliaries 
  Colonial and ‘post’-colonial insurgencies after the Second World War are 
characterized by a complex coexistence and cooperation of different military forces. 
Regularized colonial troops that had their roots in the ‘martial races’ era fought 
alongside metropolitan units and allied foreign military forces. At the same time, 
western powers also started recruiting a new category of local irregular auxiliaries, 
whose main value was mostly not seen in their military contribution, but in their 
political impact on the conflict dynamic: these auxiliaries, though ostensibly recruited 
for military purposes, were raised as a conspicuous sign of loyalism among the native 
population. The following section will consider the emergence of loyalist auxiliaries 
in Indochina, Malaya, Kenya, Algeria, Vietnam and Dhofar. This list of historical 
instances of the use of loyalist auxiliaries is not exhaustive (loyalist militias were also 
raised in Brunei and Borneo, for instance)20, but provides a sufficiently large cross-
section of well-researched and well-documented cases to explore their characteristic 
features.21 
 
In Indochina (1946-54) the principal regular and quasi-regular forces that 
France deployed were organized in the Corps Expéditionnaire Français en Extrême-
Orient (CEFEO). CEFEO consisted of troops from the French Foreign Legion plus 
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colonial forces including former members of the tirailleurs tonkinois and tirailleurs 
annamites, but also French colonial troops from North Africa. After France’s 
recognition of Vietnam as an independent state in the 1949 Élysée accords, the 
emperor Bao Dai raised the regular Vietnamese National Army, which also fought 
against the Viet Minh forces. Early on in the campaign both France and Britain had 
successfully enlisted existing ‘private armies’ of criminal networks and religious sects 
such as the Binh Xuyen, Hoa Hao and Cao Dai into the fight against the Viet Minh. In 
1949 these were also absorbed by newly established Vietnamese National Army 
(VNA).  
 
Soon after taking up his post as commander-in-chief for CEFEO, General Jean 
de Lattre de Tassigny changed the force structure in Indochina. Where the inclusion 
of Binh Xuyen, Hoa Hao and Cao Dai into the Vietnamese National Army signified a 
process of regularization of formerly irregular auxiliaries, the de Lattre reforms aimed 
at increasing both regular forces in the framework of CEFEO and at creating new 
irregular auxiliaries or even to divert regular troops to irregular roles. De Lattre 
created the Commandos Nord Vietnam, which consisted of CEFEO troops, but had an 
irregular mission as raider units in the anti-guerrilla campaign against the Viet Minh. 
He also established the Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (GCMA), 
renamed in 1953 in Groupe Mixte d’Intervention. These were recruited from among 
the native population and initially trained and commanded by French officers. Their 
tasks were partly military and included small operations to harass the enemy and to 
carry out sabotage missions. However, more important was their mission to foster 
collaboration of the local population against the Viet Minh, both in French controlled 
and in Viet Minh territory. French commanders involved in the GCMA, many of 
whom had a background in the French résistance, referred to this task as the 
establishment of a local maquis. One of the junior officers involved in the GCMA, 
Lieutenant Pierre Dabezies argued that ‘in Indochina, the “native” side had to prevail 
over the technical side … without native cooperation, it was almost impossible to 
infiltrate the population. Therefore, natives were often recruited more for their roots 
than for their skills.’22 In other words, while their military value remained limited, the 
GCMA/GMI’s primary task was to foster a loyalist network among the native 
population. However, their limited military prowess did not mean that they were 
exempt from Viet Minh violence. On the contrary, they often were its prime target. 
 10 
 
In the Malayan Emergency (1948-60), a wide variety of forces were deployed 
in the fight against the communist, Chinese-dominated insurgency mounted by the 
Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA). In addition to British armed forces and 
other Commonwealth troops from Australia and New Zealand, Britain also deployed 
two battalions of the Royal Malay Regiment, seven Ghurka battalions and three 
King’s African Rifles (KAR) battalions. Before the onset of the emergency Britain 
had attempted to raise a multi-communal ‘Malayan army’, which was supposed to 
include ethnic groups other than the majority Malays. However, this had failed owing 
to Malay resistance.23 
 
Partly as a result of this failure, British initiatives of enlisting the Chinese 
community in the fight against the MNLA focused on the newly established auxiliary 
forces, the Home Guard. The Home Guard was mainly tasked with upholding the 
security of the New Villages. By 1952, the Home Guard numbered 250,000 and drew 
on both Malay and Chinese sections of the population. Neither Malay nor Chinese 
Home Guard units were seen as militarily highly effective. The British were 
particularly suspicious with respect to the Chinese Home Guards, who were initially 
even more poorly equipped than their Malay counterparts and were only given 
additional weapons as a reward once they had proven their loyalty.24  
 
However, the real value of the Home Guard did not lie in their military 
effectiveness anyway. According to David French, ‘Only partly trained and equipped 
with shotguns, their ratio of kills to contacts was the lowest of all elements of the 
security forces. But that hardly mattered. Their real importance was that they helped 
sustain the morale of Malaya’s population in the face of insurgent intimidation, and 
forced the Chinese, however reluctantly, to side with the security forces.’ 25 
Conversely, the existence of the Home Guard sapped the insurgents’ morale: ‘The 
mere suspicion among the MNLA that Home Guard might give information hurt 
morale.’26 
 
In Kenya during the Mau Mau uprising, we see a similar picture of a variety of 
European, colonial and native auxiliary forces operating alongside each other. British 
army and Royal Air Force (RAF) deployed to Kenya in 1952, in addition to five KAR 
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regiments. The Kenya Regiment, a settler militia, also took part in the security forces’ 
combined operations. In addition, the colonial administration recruited native 
irregular auxiliaries shortly after the start of the uprising. Inspired by the Home Guard 
in Malaya, the Kenyan Home Guard was created in July 1952. By March 1954 it 
numbered 25,600 native Kikuyu loyalists. Even though the Home Guard was never 
formally incorporated in the military chain of command, it often found itself in the 
midst of the violent conflict between the Mau Mau and the British security forces. 
This also meant that Home Guard members were highly vulnerable to attacks.27 
Unsurprisingly, the Home Guard became the victim of one of the most notorious 
atrocities of the Mau Mau uprising, the Lari massacre of 25 and 26 March 1953, in 
which Mau Mau killed between 74 and 100 members of the Home Guard and their 
families.28 
 
After the Lari massacre, the structure of the Home Guard was overhauled and 
settler officers took on command of individual Home Guard units. Its core mission 
gradually changed as well: while the Home Guard was initially designed as a self-
defense force, after 1953 it increasingly took an active part in the violence and was 
‘entrusted with counter-terror’.29  Indeed, according to David Anderson, doing the 
‘dirty work’ of state counter-terror became the foremost task of the Home Guard: 
‘Using the Home Guard as surrogates, British officials ignored gross atrocities … and 
contracted out interrogation and torture to their allies.’30 However, the British valued 
counter-terror not primarily due to its military effectiveness. What was more 
important was the concomitant ‘polarisation of the population, the swing towards 
loyalism, and the crystallization of a loyalist identity’, which led to a more profound 
consolidation of the security situation in Kenya.  
 
Finally, native Kikuyu were also recruited into so-called ‘pseudo-gangs’, a 
practice that has become associated with the name of the British officer Frank Kitson. 
Pseudo-gangs were dressed up as Mau Mau and were used in 1953 and 1954 to hunt 
down remaining Mau Mau in the Aberdare forest. While they were militarily rather 
effective, they did not have the same political value as the loyalist Home Guard. In 
fact, only few loyalists took part in the pseudo-gang operations, which were mostly 
manned by turned Mau Mau detainees. The latter did not act out of loyalist motives; 
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rather, they were forced to join the pseudo-gangs in order to avoid being hanged for 
their participation in the uprising.31 
 
In Algeria (1954-62), a similar picture emerged. The French army fought 
alongside ten North African tirailleur regiments. There was even a limited number of 
former tirailleurs from the Far East Commando involved. After the outbreak of the 
ALN revolt in 1954, the French colonial administration started recruiting local 
irregular auxiliaries. So-called moghnaznis were designated as local self-defence 
forces, while the harkis had the task of participating in anti-guerrilla operations. The 
latter far outnumbered the former throughout the conflict, and the term harkis was 
often used as a catch-all phrase for all sorts of native collaborators. 
 
Initially, the recruitment of harkis followed a pattern familiar from earlier 
colonial times. In 1954 the French ethnologist Jean Servier raised harkis by exploiting 
the traditional conflicts among Berber tribes in the Aurès region.32 Mass mobilization 
of harkis only took off with the implementation of the Challe offensive between 1958 
and 1960. During these years the number of harkis peaked at approximately 60,000, 
which meant that the harkis outnumbered ALN fighters. 
 
In contrast to the regular colonial forces deployed in Algeria, harkis were 
hired on a daily basis, and their access to weapons was limited. 33  In part, the 
recruitment of harkis was inspired by notions harkening back to the martial races 
discourse: ‘Another assumption – explicit in some documents – was they [the harkis] 
had a specific form of violence, a native way of being violent that was adapted to a 
war against natives.’34 However, even if the harkis, similar to the Home Guard in 
Kenya, were instrumentalized for counter-terror purposes, their military value was 
always limited, not least owing to their poor training and armament. Their political 
value in the form of their conspicuous ‘loyalism’ was far more important for the 
French colonial administration: ‘the harkis were presented as “Algerians fighting on 
the French side”. As long as the war went on and the ALN lost more and more men, 
the French could claim that there were more Algerians on their side than on the 
ALN’s.’35 Indeed, the French were careful to depict the harkis as being driven by 
noble motivations and as having joined the French in their fight against the ALN 
deliberately, rather than being coerced into making opportunistic choices, which are 
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typical for situations of irregular warfare. Similar to the French rhetoric in Indochina, 
General Challe insisted that the harkis should have ‘a mentality of attacking 
maquisards and not one of collaborators. … If we build heroes of the Résistance, the 
population will be on our side.’36 
 
The Vietnam War (1962-75) offers the most complex picture regarding the 
diversity of troops deployed to combat the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese 
armed forces. In the course of the escalation of the conflict in 1965, US army and 
Marine Corps and Australian armed forces joined the Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam, which had been created after the partition of Vietnam in the 1954 Geneva 
accords, in its fight against the North and its communist insurgent allies.  
 
South Vietnam had already created its own militia forces in 1955 in the wake 
of the Geneva accords, the Territorial Forces, later renamed Regional Forces (RF) and 
Popular Forces (PF). Originally tasked with local security and self-defence, RF/PF, 
known as ‘Ruff-Puffs’ among US officers, were primarily deployed in the framework 
of US ‘pacificiation’ programmes in Vietnam, such as the in the Marine-led 
Combined Action Programme (CAP) as well as in CORDS (Civil Operations and 
Revolutionary Development Support), which was established in 1967. Both the first 
head of CORDS, Robert Komer, and his successor after November 1968, William 
Colby, worked to increase the number of RF/PF forces. In 1969, they numbered 
475,000. Even though RF/PF were poorly trained and armed, they absorbed a high 
degree of Viet Cong violence and suffered consistently higher casualty rates than the 
ARVN. Yet they remained underequipped throughout the conflict and often did not 
receive ARVN support when they requested it.37 However, both Andrew Krepinevich 
and Mark Moyar argue that the RF/PF were militarily effective in the decentralized 
campaign against the Viet Cong. 38  Still, they remained dependent on support by 
regular troops: after the withdrawal of US forces RF/PF units were integrated into the 
ARVN command structure, but destroyed during the fall of Saigon in 1975. 
 
A second irregular auxiliary force were the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups 
(CIDG), which the CIA created as early as 1961. In 1963 command over CIDG was 
transferred from the CIA to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MAC-V). 
CIDG members were recruited from among the montagnard tribes of the central 
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highlands of South Vietnam. The practice of raising montagnard tribes for counter-
insurgency efforts went back to French colonial times. The highland mountain people 
were traditionally opposed to the Annamite majority in Vietnam.  The initial purpose 
of CIDG was local defence and civic action in their native highland territories. 
However, they became increasingly highly trained and involved in military operations 
outside of their own areas in Special Forces (SF) roles. In 1970 they were formally 
integrated into the ARVN as SF Vietnam Army Ranger units. 
 
Pseudo-gangs were also recruited in Vietnam in the form of the Provincial 
Reconnaissance Units (PRUs). The PRUs included many former Viet Cong who had 
been induced to switch sides in the framework of the Chieu Hoi (‘open arms’) 
programme. Their mission was the destruction of Viet Cong infrastructure within the 
framework of the controversial Phoenix programme. Phoenix was integrated into 
CORDS in 1967 and gathered momentum in 1968 and 1969, at a time when concerns 
over the moral costs of the Vietnam War became increasingly central in the wake of 
the My Lai massacre in March 1968. Even though the PRUs were seen as militarily 
effective, the US army’s concerns over their practices grew. According to Dale 
Andrade, ‘the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] simply wanted someone else to do the dirty 
work’.39 As a result, the army withdrew its advisors from the PRUs in 1970 and 
Phoenix continued under the direction of the CIA until 1972. 
 
Last but not least, in April 1968 the South Vietnamese government also started 
to raise a loyalist militia force, the People’s Self-Defense Force. It counted 4 million 
members, but had only 600,000 weapons at its disposal. Again, its political value was 
much greater than its military effectiveness: ‘Probably more important than any 
military capability presented by these forces was the overt commitment to the 
government represented by their participation.’40 
 
The example of the Vietnam War illustrates how different types of auxiliaries 
could co-exist within the framework of one operational theatre. The variety of 
different auxiliary fighters as well as their evolving and fluctuating roles in large parts 
reflects the ambiguous strategic situation that the US forces faced in Vietnam. What is 
more important, however, is that the case of Vietnam highlights the comparative 
vulnerability of those auxiliary forces who resemble most closely the loyalist type as 
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opposed to those who, like the CIDG, started out as partisans and later became 
regularized. 
 
During the Dhofar rebellion (1963-76), a very limited number of British army 
and Special Air Service (SAS) troops, plus soldiers from the Imperial Iranian Armed 
Forces supported the Omani Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) against Dhofari rebel 
groups. British troops were first deployed in 1970. Part of the renewed pacification 
effort under Sultan Qaboos after 1970 envisaged the recruitment of native tribal 
auxiliaries, so-called firqats. Their number grew from 300 in 1970 to 1,200 in 1974. 
From the start, the role of the firqats was seen as essential in engendering loyalism in 
Dhofar: the firqats were  ‘an essential bridge between the Omani government and the 
Dhofari population’.41 However, they were also used in military operations against the 
rebels. Yet, their military effectiveness soon proved extremely limited: ‘The irregular 
firqats proved a disappointment. Each firqat mutinied at least once, they refused to 
serve in areas or with individuals not of their tribe, and their members frequently 
informed the enemy of their movements. Operations dependent on the firqats, such as 
Operation Jaguar or the attack on the Shershitti caves, failed. As Brigadier Graham 
observed, “They [the firqats] operate not as ordered, but as their own interests dictate. 
Thus, no firm military plan can be made to which their participation is 
indispensable.”’42  
 
The contribution the firqats made to military victory over the Dhofari 
insurgency has been a subject for debate.43 What seems to be undisputed is that the 
firqats proved to be fickle allies at best, and that their support in combat could not be 
counted on, even if they performed better in intelligence roles and in securing areas 
cleared from rebels. 
 
 
Loyalism and the moral re-evaluation of the irregular auxiliary 
The examples of colonial and post-colonial warfare described above 
demonstrate the involvement of a variety of different types of armed forces in these 
conflicts. In Indochina, Malaya, Kenya and Algeria, colonial troops such as 
tirailleurs, Gurkha troops, KAR and Malay Regiment forces were deployed alongside 
metropolitan troops. The historical origins of their recruitment had in most cases been 
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inspired by the nineteenth century ‘martial races’ discourse, but they had become 
increasingly regularized in the meantime. In Vietnam and Dhofar, and in the later 
stages of the Indochina War, western troops supported native regular armies (the 
ARVN, SAF and VNA respectively). In Malaya and Kenya, colonial troops (the KAR 
and the Malay Regiment respectively) formed the core of the emerging state armies 
after independence.  
 
Some of the contemporary recruitment practices in the insurgencies outlined 
above seemed to follow historical frameworks and ideas. The French and British 
initiative during the Indochina war to recruit Binh Xuyen, Hoa Hao and Cao Dai 
fighters into the counterinsurgency effort is both reminiscent of the eighteenth century 
‘partisan’ concept and of the ‘martial races’ approach to recruiting native auxiliaries. 
The recruitment of montagnard tribes into the CIDG during the Vietnam War 
effectively harkened back to the French colonial use of these tribes in the nineteenth 
century, hence echoing themes from the ‘martial races’ discourse. Finally, even 
though the recruitment and use of Kenyan Home Guards and Algerian harkis 
ostensibly corresponded more squarely with the loyalist framework, contemporaries’ 
rhetoric and practices had some over and undertones of the martial races discourse 
too. The idea that native violence could only be matched by natives and that counter-
terror should hence be left to the natives straddles the boundaries of the loyalism 
framework and the martial races mindset. 
 
The recruitment of natives into the counter-insurgency effort also displayed 
some similarities with the eighteenth century concept of the partisan as the tactical 
counterpart of regular armed forces. The most straightforward example in this respect 
is de Lattre’s creation of the Commandos Nord Vietnam, which were recruited from 
the regular VNA in order to conduct raiding missions into north Vietnamese territory. 
However, the establishments of pseudo-gangs in Kenya and in Vietnam also partly 
served a similar tactical purpose in that they were established with the aim to ‘mop 
up’ remaining insurgents cells. Even though the fact that the members of the pseudo-
gangs had ostensibly been ‘turned’, it was difficult to depict them as loyalists in the 
stricter sense of the term, as their commitment to the counter-insurgency effort was so 
obviously a result of coercion. 
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The most striking development in the recruitment of native auxiliary fighters 
in insurgencies after 1945 is the rise of the intellectual and political framework of 
loyalism as the background for their recruitment. The GCMA/GMI in Indochina, the 
Home Guard in Malaya and Kenya, the harkis in Algeria, the RF/PF and the People’s 
Self-Defense Force in Vietnam and the firqats in Dhofar all share similar traits: they 
were mostly insufficiently trained and armed and, as a result, had only limited 
military effect. 44  Despite their vulnerability, loyalist auxiliaries were often left 
exposed in the midst of the conflict, in the villages and remote rural areas, as 
conspicuous defenders of the government’s cause; however, with little to no military 
support. Ironically, the lack of weapons at the disposal of loyalist forces often seemed 
to stem from an inherent distrust of their very loyalty on the part of the colonial or 
post-colonial administrations, as was the case with the Chinese Home Guard in 
Malaya and the harkis in French Algeria. However, more important than suspicion 
regarding their loyalty as a factor for their poor armament and weak integration into 
military structures was that their purpose was not primarily military, but political. 
Even if their local knowledge could be beneficial for intelligence purposes and even if 
their ‘native’ way of fighting often seemed suited for the purposes of counter-terror, 
in none of the cases described above the colonial or post-colonial administrations 
made efforts to foster those capabilities by increasing military or intelligence training 
or by providing better equipment. The prime value of loyalist militias lay in their role 
as a symbol of the legitimacy of the colonial power’s or the supported government’s 
counter-insurgency efforts and political positions, and their purchase among the local 
population. 
 
How did this novel template of recruiting native auxiliaries emerge? In order 
to understand this development, we have to analyse it in the broader framework of the 
history of irregular warfare and the concept of the irregular fighter. 45  The moral 
coding of the irregular fighter, which up until the Second World War had been 
characterized by the paradoxical trends of his or her marginalization as ‘bandits’, 
‘brigands’, ‘rebels’ or ‘savages’ on the one hand and their veneration (and 
regularization) as ‘martial races’ on the other, underwent a re-evaluation after the 
Second World War. The experience of the Second World War had demonstrated that 
irregular fighters, such as the numerous resistance groups fighting Nazi German and 
Imperial Japanese occupation could be morally vindicated. As a result, after the 
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Second World War, it was increasing difficult to vilify insurgent groups simply on the 
basis of the irregular tactics that they used. The rise of international communism also 
meant that insurgents could more easily be labeled ‘communist terrorists’, which 
indicated that from a western perspective, it was not so much their way of fighting 
that was reprehensible, but their political – or, even worse religious, in the case of the 
Mau Mau – motives for taking up the fight. 
 
It is revealing in this respect that in many cases the discourse of loyalism 
harkened back to the moral universe of the Second World War and to the resistance 
against totalitarian regimes. Loyalists were deliberately recruited as irregular native 
auxiliaries, and in contrast to their colonial predecessors such as the tirailleurs, 
Gurkhas, KAR and Malay Regiment, they did not undergo a process of regularization 
in the course of the counter-insurgencies outlined above. On the contrary, their 
irregularity was often depicted as the very symbol of their legitimacy: in Indochina, 
the GCMA/GMI were tasked with establishing a ‘maquis’ – a term that originated in 
the framework of the French résistance. In Algeria, General Challe explicitly 
mentioned the résistance as the appropriate mindset and moral ideal of the harkis. 
 
What did this shift towards a loyalist framework of recruitment and 
organization of native auxiliaries mean for those who fought in them? The main effect 
was a potential perpetuation of their vulnerability into the post-conflict, post-colonial 
phase. Unsurprisingly, the fate of loyalist auxiliaries depended on the outcome of the 
conflict: in Malaya, Kenya and Dhofar, all of which were deemed a victory for the 
counter-insurgent side (albeit the outcome in Malaya and Kenya was decolonization, 
of course), former loyalist auxiliaries fared well and often rose to power positions in 
the post-colonial state, such as in Kenya.46 In those cases where the counter-insurgent 
side was defeated and the political authorities were formed from among the ranks of 
its former opponent, the fate of the former loyalists was much less favourable. In 
Indochina, as French forces withdrew from an increasing number of areas between 
1950 and 1954, they knew that the loyalists would become the target of revenge 
attacks. Many loyalists begged the French officers to take them along and to protect 
them. It was a traumatic experience for the officers involved, and one that contributed 
to the revolt of parts of the French army in 1961 in Algeria, as it became clear that the 
harkis would face a similar fate after French withdrawal.47 And indeed, they did: an 
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estimated 30,000 - 40,000 Algerian Muslim loyalists were killed in the wake of 
Algerian independence.48 Many harkis tried to flee to France; however, de Gaulle was 
adamant that they were not to be relocated. ‘According to de Gaulle’s cold calculus 
the harkis had to be sacrificed because unlike the settlers, they belonged to a separate 
culture and religion.’49 In Vietnam, the Hue massacre of 1968, in which troops of the 
North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong had killed an estimated 2,800 to 6,000 
loyalists and civilians after battle of Hue, had spread fear among loyalists over their 
fate in the event of a communist victory. The widespread panic that accompanied the 
North Vietnamese advance and the fall of Saigon in 1975 was a manifestation of these 
fears, as was the hectic US evacuation of Saigon in April 1975. There were 
allegations that US embassy staff in Saigon failed to destroy the records of about 
30,000 former members of the PRUs operating in the framework of the Phoenix 
programme. The records allegedly fell into the hands of the communists after they 
took over Saigon, and many former loyalists were allegedly killed.50 
 
 
Conclusion 
The preceding sections have traced the trajectory of western collaboration 
with native auxiliaries. They discussed three intellectual templates of the use of native 
auxiliaries: the eighteenth century model of auxiliary ‘partisans’ as tactical 
complements to regular armed forces; the nineteenth century transformation of the 
‘partisan’ to the irregular guerrilla fighter and the concomitant rise of the ‘martial 
races’ discourse; and, finally, the post-1945 model of the loyalist auxiliary as a 
symbol of the political legitimacy of the counter-insurgent side in the wars of 
decolonization and post-colonial insurgencies.  
 
Loyalist auxiliaries differed from their nineteenth and early twentieth century 
predecessors in that they were largely irregular and not integrated into formal military 
command structures. They were both poorly armed and poorly trained, which meant 
that their military contribution was limited. Even though they were sometimes 
entrusted with ‘special’ missions such as counter-terror, their true value was political 
rather than military, in that they signified broad popular support for the cause and the 
political agenda of the counter-insurgent side. The rise of the loyalist template after 
the end of the Second World War, the article has argued, was a result of the moral 
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reappraisal of irregular fighters as morally vindicated ‘resistance’ fighters and 
liberators.   
 
However, the article has also demonstrated that the use of auxiliaries in wars 
in the peripheries of the international system after 1945 was not limited to loyalist 
auxiliaries, even though their emergence was the most conspicuous trend in the post-
Second World War context. Rather, some auxiliary formations such as the recruitment 
of montagnard tribes during the Vietnam War or the creation of the Commandos Nord 
Vietnam during the Indochina War ostensibly harkened back to earlier templates – the 
‘martial races’ template and the ‘partisan’ template respectively. This leads us to the 
final question, which is to what extent the three templates have affected the 
recruitment of native auxiliaries in wars with western involvement in the twenty-first 
century?  
 
In general, the recruitment of native auxiliaries and their potential 
regularization into national armed forces has not been an overwhelming success so 
far. The western-trained Afghan National Army continues to be beset by problems 
related to corruption, ethnic factionalism, poor training and poor leadership. In the 
spring of 2014, the Iraqi Army disintegrated under the pressure of advancing Islamic 
State (IS) militants. The anti-Gadhafi forces in Libya that were supposed to form a 
new Libyan government are currently on the verge of plunging the country into a new 
civil war. Of course, the West cannot be blamed for all of the arising problems – in 
many cases local factors played a larger role. However, often the way in which the 
West tries to integrate local forces into its own strategic plans seemed to follow mixed 
and unclear agendas and models. Antonio Giustozzi, for instance, has argued with 
regard to the problems besetting the ANA: ‘From the very beginning the ANA was 
torn between two opposite concepts of its role, that is acting as the auxiliary 
indigenous force of an occupying power or becoming a central/’national’ army, able 
to secure the monopoly of force for the government of Afghanistan and to serve its 
internal and foreign policy aims.’51 
 
The instances of the use of native auxiliaries in recent conflicts in which the 
West seemed to follow to some extent the template of loyalism provide a stark 
warning that the pitfalls of loyalist auxiliaries have not changed much over the past 
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decades. The most relevant example in this respect is the way in which the US-led 
coalition in Iraq attempted to capitalize on the Anbar Awakening starting in 2006 and 
to formalize it subsequently in the framework of the Sons of Iraq (SOI) scheme. 
Initially hailed as a masterstroke of US COIN experts, it was seen as a central element 
of the US forces’ efforts to turn the tide of the insurgency in Iraq.52 However, after the 
US withdrawal from Iraq, the Iraqi government under Nouri al-Maliki proved fickle 
in its approach to the SOI and ostensibly reneged on its commitment to integrate SOI 
fighters into the Iraqi security forces or the civilian administration. A US-run 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme focused on 
teaching former SOI fighters vocational skills had started before the withdrawal of the 
US forces, but was apparently not continued by the Iraqi government.53 Sidelined by 
the Shiite dominated government and repeatedly targeted by sectarian violence, many 
of the former SOI fighters reportedly joined IS in 2014.54 More recent reports indicate 
that at least one tribe that was central to the SOI scheme, Albu Nimr, became the 
target of a massacre carried out by IS forces in October 2014.55 Loyalists who cannot 
count on western military protection, it seems, face a stark choice: continue to fight or 
become the target of violence. 
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